What are the things that we assert, believe, and desire? The orthodox view among philosophers is eternalism: these are contents that have their truth-values eternally. Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world. Berit Brogaard argues that temporal contents are contents and propositions in the full sense. This project involves a thorough analysis of how we talk about and retain mental states over time, an examination of how the phenomenology of mental states bear on the content of mental states, an analysis of how we pass on information in temporally extended conversations, and a revival of a Priorian tense logic. The view suggests a broader view according to which some types of representation have a determinate truth-value only relative to features about the subject who does the representing. If this view is right, successful semantic representation requires an eye on our own position in the world.

Review

" Transient Truths is a welcome addition to the philosophical literature that is bound to reignite the discussion about the temporal features of propositions.^"--Ulrich Meyer, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"This essay on constituents of propositions related to tense...is written in an informal, clear, engaging style.... A great teaching resource for the clarity of its rendition of arguments, the sheer volume of examples covered, and the natural flow of the narrative. Of significant interest to philosophers of time; required reading for philosophers of logic, language, and mind and for linguists concerned with temporal representation in natural language and metal states."--A. Mercier, CHOICE

Book Description

Argues for the controversial view that the meaning contents of our utterances and conscious mental states depend on facts about the speaker or bearer of the mental state.

About the Author

Dr. Berit Brogaard , Associate Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at University of Missouri, St. Louis, has written since 1999 for publications such as Journal of Philosophy, Nous, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and Consciousness and Cognition. In her academic research she specializes in visual perception and semantics. From 2007 to 2009 she was a research fellow at the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University. She has a medical degree in neuroscience from the Danish National Hospital and the University of Copenhagen and a Ph.D. in philosophy from State University of New York.